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Abstract 
New smartphone technologies for the first time provide 
a platform for a new type of on-person, public health 
data collection and also a new type of informational 
public health intervention. In such interventions, it is 
the device via automatically collecting data relevant to 
the individual’s health that triggers the receipt of an 
informational public health intervention relevant to 
that individual. This will enable far more targeted and 
personalized public health interventions than 
previously possible. However, furthermore, sensor-
based public health data collection, combined with 
such informational public health interventions provides 
the underlying platform for a novel and powerful new 
form of learning public health system. In this paper we 
provide an architecture for such a sensor-based 
learning public health system, in particular one which 
maintains the anonymity of its individual participants, 
we describe its algorithm for iterative public health 
intervention improvement, and examine and provide an 
evaluation of its anonymity maintaining 
characteristics. 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
The recent rapid growth in both the capabilities and 
uptake of mobile devices with sensors or smartphones 
capable of acting as health sensor platforms has the 
potential to advance public health data collection and 
intervention. Whilst the majority of research and 
commercial focus to-date has been on mobile devices 
and sensors as a tool for individual health data capture, 
monitoring and feedback, the full implications for 
public health have been less well explored.  
In this paper we build upon an underlying platform 
that provides a smartphone-based system for 
anonymized population health data capture and 
intervention [1] to present a novel sensor-based 
Learning Public Health System (LPHS). The 
underlying platform from prior research provides a 
novel methodology whereby 1) public health data can 
be collected without the individual being identified or 
subject to re-identification based upon their data; and 
2) enables targeted public health interventions to be 
distributed, performed and evaluated without the need 
for the identifying details of an individual to ever leave 
their mobile device. The novel contribution of this 
current paper is the description and evaluation of a 
learning public health system and its iterative 
algorithm for refining public health interventions that 
can be built upon this underlying platform. 
The underlying platform from previous research 
does not need a fully trusted central server, which 
might prove impractical on population-scale 
applications [1]. Beyond de-identification the approach 
taken also resolves the risk of re-identification based 
on quasi-identifiers, in the form of information known 
about individuals that could potentially be used to 
match with and re-identify the submitted data. The 
conventional approach to address this type of risk is to 
use a trusted server or aggregation point to combine 
and obfuscate/alter data to the point where k-
anonymity [2] is assured for a data set, such that any 
individual is indiscernible from k other records based 
on quasi-identifiers. 
The proposed Learning Public Health System 
involves an iterative algorithm that is extensible to 
numerous types of health sensor data collection, public 
health application areas and types of public health 
intervention.  
 
2. Related work 
 
The use of participatory sensing is of increasing 
interest in a number of application areas including air 
quality and pollution sensing [3] through the use of 
external air quality sensors, urban area noise level data 
[4], urban traffic analysis through the use of vehicle 
mounted sensors [5] and vehicle fuel efficiency [6], 
amongst many other applications.  
The rich capabilities of participatory sensing have 
garnered interest in its usage for a range of such 
applications. This has in turn spurred a number of 
different approaches to resolving or decreasing the 
implicit security and privacy concerns when involving 
individuals in sensing/data collection. The more 
conventional approach would use a trusted server, then 
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k-anonymity [2] or a variant, to anonymize the data 
before it is accessible for research/analysis. Of course 
this approach suffers from the need for a fully trusted 
server as well as issues of a single point of failure in 
terms of privacy breaches. Alternatively, other 
approaches have improved on this by removing some 
sensitive information before submission (removal of 
identifiers and communications anonymity) with a 
central point of trust [7] to provide an anonymous 
approach. While this is quite effective when the 
sensing is collecting data on something not specific to 
the individual, this alone is not well-suited to a model 
where quasi-identifiers are a key submission 
component (such as in the case of collection of public 
health data) as de-identification protection is still 
implemented at a central trusted point. 
To resolve the issue of requiring a fully trusted 
server, alternative approaches include decentralized 
participatory sensing networks [8] using user 
interaction/awareness as part of the approach or 
keeping the data managed by the participant [9] and 
stringent user-definable access control mechanisms to 
manage sharing. While these approaches may be 
extensible to some aspects of Health Participatory 
Sensing Networks (HPSNs) [10], they typically have 
not incorporated the need and importance of health 
interventions, an important aspect in HPSNs and a 
capability that does not have a direct parallel in most 
participatory sensing systems. Additionally, the 
capabilities that are beneficial in other areas may make 
these approaches overly complex for individuals, 
limiting their feasibility for a large scale 
implementation. For this reason, amongst others, the 
approach of users consciously building a “web of trust” 
as per [8] and the personal data vault of [9] were not 
used in our approach to a sensor-based LPHS. The 
LPHS however draws on some aspects of the 
anonymizing capabilities provided by a HPSN [10] in 
building the middle layer of a LPHS (see Figure 1). 
Whilst the concepts of a Learning Health System 
[11] as put forward by the US Institute of Medicine 
have been published, there has yet to be work 
published in relation to the technical mechanisms for 
implementing this for public health interventions via 
such technologies as smartphones, sensors and 
anonymizing networks as are put forward in this 
current paper. This represents a significant contribution 
of this current work.  
 
3. A sensor-based learning public health 
system architecture 
 
The overall system architecture (Figure 1) involves 
a LPHS server that communicates with mobile devices 
through an anonymizing HPSN to provide 
communications anonymity, and mobile devices that 
incorporate local processing and privacy thresholds to 
maintain data anonymity/privacy/de-identification. 
 
 
Figure 1. Learning public health system 
architecture 
There are two primary data transmissions from and 
to the LPHS server respectively: (1) public health 
interventions are distributed from the LPHS server, and 
(2) intervention effect capture/ anonymized data 
collection submissions are sent to the LPHS server. 
The core functionality components of the LHPS server 
are (1) distribution of public health interventions; (2) 
aggregation of public health data; (3) analysis; and (4) 
support for public health intervention refinement. 
The fundamental architecture can support different 
levels of public health intervention and public health 
data capture. The capabilities of the end user mobile 
devices as well as the level of participation in the 
public health interventions/ data collection tasks of the 
individual users of these devices will have implications 
for this also. We discuss these functional capabilities in 
the following subsections.  
 
3.1 Smartphone-provided capabilities 
 
When an individual utilizes just a smartphone 
without additional external sensors and the user is not 
required to take additional actions, this configuration 
has the advantage that it has the greatest level of 
existing deployment and ease of adoption – that is, 
smartphones without additional external sensors are the 
most common smartphone usage case.  
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3.2 Peripheral device sensors 
 
An individual participating in the LPHS can also 
have the situation that they have additional external 
sensors connected to their smartphone. Increasingly 
additional health sensor data capture is available such 
as vital signs and blood constituent sensors [1]. An 
emerging area of application, but one still with 
substantive implementation challenges is the 
automated capture of dietary and nutritional intake 
information [12].  
 
3.3 Intervention capabilities 
 
The LPHS provides inputs to the individual while 
participating in the LPHS, to affect the health-related 
actions. Whilst an ‘active’ participatory sensing model 
for a typical sensing task might focus on achieving 
more complete data collection in terms of 
spatial/temporal range, LPHS-related active sensing 
would be more concerned with affecting a health-
related action and hence have a component equating to 
a public health intervention. As such, the instigation to 
carry out ’active’ sensing activities could essentially 
constitute a public health intervention input. 
Additionally, for LPHS purposes and key to the nature 
of a sensor-based LPHS, this allows for immediate and 
continuous feedback on the effectiveness of campaigns 
upon targeted groups.  
 
4. Learning public health system algorithm 
 
The LHPS algorithm (Figure 2) includes the following 
steps: 
1. distribution of a public health intervention 
2. effect capture 
3. analysis of effect 
4. identification of most and least successful 
effects 
5. intervention modification and tailoring 
6. return to step 1 
The connection of participatory sensing with a learning 
public health system and this algorithm are novel 
contributions to the current literature, with the overall 
algorithm developed newly for the LPHS. 
 
4.1 Distribution of a public health intervention 
 
A public health intervention in the case of a sensor-
based LPHS consists of an informational intervention: 
that is, some form of information - textual, multimedia 
or other - is distributed to the individual’s device to 
affect positively a behavior that has a bearing on the 
individual’s health. As of current technology, this 
device might most likely be the individual’s 
smartphone, but this could be any device and the 
nature of the most suitable device for the receipt of an 
intervention will inevitably change over time even if 
only just due to technological advancement. 
 
 
Figure 2. Learning public health system 
iterative algorithm 
Firstly, a cohort to be the recipients of a public 
health intervention is identified. How this cohort may 
be refined is described in the following sub-sections, 
but an initial cohort is identified based upon some 
criterion/ criteria. For example, this may include the 
group who has high blood pressure or who are 
considered at risk of high blood pressure. The data 
necessary for this initial cohort identification can be 
determined via traditional clinical electronic records, or 
can be obtained anonymously via the underlying 
smartphone-based HPSN platform described in 
previous work [1, 10].  
Secondly, for a particular cohort, an appropriate 
informational public health intervention is designed/ 
chosen. This will be a manual process, whereby public 
health intervention designers will determine what is the 
appropriate content, frequency of communication, 
mode etc. to be used.  
The LPHS server provides the central component 
of the system. It will initiate the distribution of the 
informational intervention and this will be sent 
anonymously to the identified cohort, to their end-user 
mobile devices, but through the intermediary of the 
anonymizing HPSN (see Figure 1). 
The public health intervention distribution 
mechanism is in theory scalable to very large numbers 
of recipients, that is, scalable to the sub-population or 
national population level. 
 
3461
4.2 Effect capture 
 
The nature of the sensor-based LPHS and the 
underlying smartphone-based anonymizing 
information system, is that data from the recipients of 
the public health intervention, about the effect of the 
intervention, can start to be collected almost 
immediately. Again this information is collected from 
the recipients via the underlying anonymizing platform 
so that no individuals are identified. 
The duration to wait into the course of the 
intervention for data collection to occur so as to assess 
the intervention, is nevertheless a function of the 
intervention itself. It would be determined by the 
intervention designers as to what duration of time 
should pass before the collected health sensor data 
would be a meaningful indicator of any potential effect 
of the intervention. 
The LPHS server captures the incoming sensing 
data, but once again via the intermediary anonymizing 
layer. The underlying HPSN [10] provides a mix 
network [13] or onion network [14], which provides 
for anonymity of the submitter as well as secure 
communication. Such approaches utilize a chain of 
proxy servers, which can provide anonymity for both 
parties, though in this case it is only required for the 
mobile device user. Though this creates additional 
implementation complexity the potential benefit to real 
privacy is significant, with the only remaining 
significant privacy threat being the content of the data 
submitted. 
As our approach incorporates submissions of 
variable resolution (that is submissions for the effect of 
the same intervention can provide more or less detail), 
the LPHS server works to integrate this data and 
provide any data cleansing as necessary. 
For the minimum resolution of data the aggregation 
is straightforward as the more detailed submissions are 
just summarized to the same level [15].  
 
4.3 Analysis of effect 
 
Once the data of the cohort which has experienced 
the public health intervention is received by the LPHS 
server, these data can be analyzed in relation to various 
characteristics. 
At one level, Online Analytical Processing 
(OLAP)-like analysis can occur slicing and dicing this 
data according to particular demographic factors or 
demographic combinations. Of interest will be which 
sub-cohorts saw improvement (or otherwise) from the 
intervention, and to what extent. The measures of 
improvement would again be a factor determined from 
clinical expertise input and from the designers of the 
public health intervention. 
The LPHS server can also capture and calculate 
other metrics of interest for public health analysis by 
health organizations, other than specifically relevant to 
the evaluation of a given public health intervention. 
4.4 Identification of most and least successful 
effects 
 
OLAP-like analysis of the intervention 
effectiveness data will allow the determination of 
which sub-cohorts had the best effect from the public 
health intervention and which had the worst or least 
effect. This OLAP analysis will break this down 
according to demographic and demographic 
combinations. 
In addition to an OLAP-like analysis of the 
received intervention effectiveness, machine learning 
and predictive analytics techniques can also be utilized 
upon the received intervention effectiveness data. 
Machine learning techniques could include clustering 
to identify particular clusters which either responded 
well to the intervention or which did not. These 
clusters may be described in a more complex way than 
being just based upon specific demographics. In any 
approach that utilized machine learning approaches, 
the intervention itself can be described in terms of 
parameter/ model inputs such as type of messaging, 
duration, frequency etc. 
The intervention effectiveness data can also be used 
for the purpose of the application of supervised 
machine learning algorithms and in particular 
predictive analytics approaches. The intervention 
effectiveness data in effect constitutes a labeled data 
set that can be used to train, test and create a predictive 
model. Utilizing these techniques, the created 
predictive model could be used to predict which 
individuals may be most receptive to the given public 
health intervention in future. 
 
4.5 Intervention modification and tailoring 
 
Once the results of the analysis of a given public 
health intervention are known these can be potentially 
utilized in a number of ways to refine the public health 
intervention. 
Firstly, based upon the OLAP analysis, the sub-
cohorts for which the public health intervention was 
least successful, can have a modified public health 
intervention designed and applied. This would be 
determined ultimately manually by the public health 
intervention designers taking into account a wide range 
of factors. For example, there could be perturbations 
made to the prior public health intervention, that the 
intervention designers may manually determine may be 
improvements.   
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Secondly, the machine learning techniques can also 
provide an automated tool to help determine which 
factors were important in the success of an 
intervention, both in terms of the nature of the 
intervention itself, but also the characteristics of the 
sub-cohorts which either responded well or otherwise. 
A developed predictive model can be used to make 
predictions as to which intervention may be successful 
for a given sub-cohort for future interventions. 
A combination of human and computationally-
derived insights can inform the choices of the public 
health intervention designers. Of particular interest 
would be making improvements to interventions sent 
to sub-cohorts for which improvements in health 
measures were not seen following the original 
intervention. Making improvements for interventions 
that were sent to sub-cohorts for which improvements 
in health measures were seen, also of course will be 
important. 
 
4.6 Repeat  
 
The refined or modified public health interventions 
can subsequently be distributed. The same process of 
obtaining feedback via the sensor-based LPHS would 
also once again occur. In this way, an iterative learning 
public health system is enabled. Its intended effect, is 
that over time and via a number of iterations to 
incrementally improve upon public health interventions 
and thereby ultimately improve population health. 
 
4.7 Case Study 
 
It should be noted that the algorithm of the LPHS 
provides ‘learning’ in the sense that the iterative 
process is not one strictly limited to the application of 
‘automated’ machine learning techniques, but the 
algorithm is such that steps 4 and 5 can utilize manual 
actions, automated machine learning/predictive models 
or a combination of both. Where machine 
learning/predictive models are used there are a plethora 
of such existing models available: support vector 
machines, k-means, decision trees, logistic regression, 
naïve bayes and ensemble approaches to name a few 
[16]. 
A simple case study where a largely automated 
machine learning technique such as support vector 
machines is applied might involve the following. An 
example intervention might be one that aims to lower 
the blood pressure of recipients with high blood 
pressure. The various characteristics of each individual 
would be known (albeit anonymously) via the LPHS, 
including such characteristics as demographic 
information and some physiological measures. These 
data would constitute the input features to the 
predictive model, in this case a support vector 
machine. The output variable for the support vector 
machine would be a categorical variable indicating the 
success/ level of success of the intervention on the 
individual: substantially lowered blood pressure, 
lowered blood pressure to a smaller degree, had no 
effect, increased blood pressure as some possible 
example success categories without quantifying the 
actual possible numerical ranges at this point. The 
values for this output variable i.e. the level of success 
of the intervention on a given individual, would be 
known from step 2 of the LPHS algorithm (Section 4.2 
Effect Capture) and hence you would have a labeled 
data set on which to train and test the support vector 
machine predictive model. The support vector machine 
would then be trained on this labeled data set and 
would then provide a predictive model that for any new 
individual could now provide a prediction as to 
whether that particular individual would respond 
successfully (or in which category of success) to the 
intervention. This support vector machine predictive 
model could then be used in making the decisions as to 
which sub-set of the population to distribute a given 
intervention to.  
For example, the decision might be made to only 
distribute the blood pressure public health intervention 
unchanged to those whom it is predicted their response 
will fall in the category of most successful response to 
the intervention.  
 
5. Mechanism for intervention adjustment 
and targeting 
 
A key capability of a learning public health system 
is the ability to redeploy the validated and tested 
targeted interventions to drive improved outcomes and 
participation.  
Further the system needs to be able to provide not 
only the subjective evaluation of how participants who 
take part in interventions have been impacted but also 
that of control groups so as to provide a comparison. 
Due to the need for anonymity inherently part of our 
system, the control needs to be set at the mobile device 
level.   
Additionally, to support the key capability of a 
public health system capable of learning and improving 
at a pace relevant to the modern world the system 
requires capabilities to modify the intervention strategy 
and approach dynamically, without losing the detail of 
the historical intervention pattern on the individual 
participant. This indicates the need for two types of 
intervention definition approaches, firstly a typical 
event type intervention that is deployed, utilized and 
then the effect captured. Secondly, an approach that is 
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more similar to a continuous flow of or ‘stream’ of 
interventions, where the potential intervention streams 
are deployed, the stream of interventions are enacted 
over time and the effect capture is periodically 
submitted. 
In the following subsections we detail the approach 
to allow local processing to define and maintain a 
combined intervention and control group of sufficient 
size and demographics to provide complementary 
information and maintain anonymity for the 
intervention participants. In addition, two main (and 
complementary) approaches, to achieve distribution of 
updateable public health interventions are covered: 
namely ‘hubs’ (see Section 5.3) and ‘streams’ (see 
Section 5.4) (Figure 3).  
 
5.1 Establishment and monitoring of control 
subjects 
 
The LPHS provides a level of anonymity, whereby 
the LPHS is not privy to the sensitive details of the 
individual or indeed interacts with the individual on a 
one-to-one basis. As such, it is not possible for the 
LPHS to explicitly define a control group. Within the 
capabilities of the LPHS, instead the decision to 
incorporate the user in the control or a specific public 
health intervention program will need to be decided at 
the individual’s device level. This process takes into 
account known demographic distributions to inform 
the decision and additionally, can take further logical 
decisions based on inclusion or exclusion rules defined 
within the intervention program.  
The use of a decentralized control group decision 
making approach would of necessity require that the 
control group is larger than what would be strictly 
necessary to evaluate the performance of an 
intervention, we propose in this work that this can be 
kept to a level that would not overly impact the utility 
of the LPHS. 
An additional challenge of the utilization of control 
groups within the LPHS is that if an individual is 
relegated to a control group, the motivation to 
participate and continue to collect data may be 
impacted.  
To mitigate against this we suggest that the control 
group be structured so that while an individual may be 
in a control for a specific intervention program, they 
may be an active member of another mutually 
exclusive intervention program, as long as the goal and 
impacts do not overlap. Additionally, to retain users 
that would otherwise perhaps discontinue participation 
if they were allocated into a control is that local 
decision making could be made at the device to 
withdraw the user from the control group and mark the 
user’s data submissions with that additional metadata, 
indicating that the users data should not be considered 
during analytical reporting, while still allowing the 
individual to benefit from the LPHS.  
 
5.2 Adjustment of intervention targeting and 
approach over time 
 
A key guideline of the LPHS is to learn and then 
apply that gained knowledge to improve the operation 
of the LPHS. Therefore it is clear that the intervention 
programs, targets and approaches will evolve over 
time. This requires that the mechanics of replacing or 
updating the in-place intervention programs with 
consideration given to impact, flexibility and the 
retention of meaningfulness of previous results.  
  
5.3 Hub intervention approach 
 
The ‘hubs’ referred to are the bundles of 
intervention-related data being distributed from the 
LPHS server composed of: 1) the intervention 
information itself; and 2) additional logic required to 
enable intervention updates. This approach involves a 
complex intervention logic and content pre-determined 
by the LPHS server that will have some ability to refer 
to additional or modified interventions through a pull 
based approach. The intervention is replaced/updated 
with new content/logic periodically to apply new 
learned approaches to public health interventions. 
Replacement is based on timed-expiry/refresh cycles.  
This is in many ways the more straightforward 
approach, though perhaps not the most practical in a 
LPHS. Due to the nature of a continually, learning 
health system the reality is that a full in-place 
replacement may need to provide logic to transition an 
individual from the current stage they are in an 
intervention to an equivalent in the updated program. 
Or in the case where targeting has changed, the 
individual may need to be moved out of the 
intervention program. The necessity to maintain the 
older logic and provide continuity until an expected 
end point is reached, creates a compounding level of 
complexity for the hub approach.   
However, the hub approach allows for a single 
focal point for the participant with new interventions 
being detected based on the data of the individual and 
retrieved in a pull based manner and applied. It also 
means there will be far less duplication than would be 
likely in a stream approach, whereby each individual 
sequence needs to contain the logic necessary to guide 
an individual’s path through the intervention program, 
and it is likely that there will be large amounts of 
similar content or logic in the sequences.  
  
5.4 Intervention stream approach 
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 Rather than a single intervention control logic and 
content block, logic is distributed throughout a stream 
of linked simpler interventions. As such the starting 
point for a stream based approach is that there will be a 
continuous and on-going intervention campaign, rather 
than a once off intervention. The stream concept allows 
for the public health intervention designers to target 
and analyze interventions as an on-going interaction or 
‘stream’ rather than a structured and finite interaction 
pattern. The participants receive at intervals a sequence 
of interconnected health interventions (called nodes in 
the sequence), where intervention logic and stream 
decision making logic is stored and processed. This 
allows the public health intervention designers to plan 
as many or as few node sequences ahead as required 
and to replace individual node sequences only if 
needed when an improved approach is required. This 
also allows for a very concrete way to split separate 
competing approaches/controls without concern for 
accidental/unplanned interaction.  
This approach allows the LPHS to target specific 
nodes in the sequence and replace or remove them 
without impacting the rest of the logic – indeed 
individuals that have already passed through those 
nodes won’t be affected either, even in cases where 
they are still taking part in an intervention program.  
 
 
Figure 3. Learning public health sytem and 
intervention update mechanisms 
 
5.4.1 Intervention switches  
Intervention stream approaches will mostly be 
composed of lightweight intervention nodes that 
contain a single targeted intervention. However, at set 
intervals it’ll be necessary to perform more detailed 
analysis and recalibration of the participant to a 
modified stream – this can occur at intervention 
switches. A switch is where a large number of streams 
come together at a specific point along the sequence. 
Similar to nodes, these switches contain logic for 
stream decision making though at a much more 
comprehensive level. Additionally, rather than 
performing interventions – these steps in the sequence 
execute the effect capture portion of the LPHS (see 
Figure 3).  
 
6. Privacy threshold approach 
 
The sensor-based LPHS by applying granular and 
modular restrictions upon data collection controlled by 
the user, reduces real privacy risks though high levels 
of user control of contribution and restrictions on data 
potentially usable for re-identification. Additionally, 
the use of a local processing approach to data 
submission and health interventions policies allows the 
on-device adaptation to achieve a data submission 
which matches the data request as closely as possible 
without breaching variable user defined privacy 
conditions. 
The core concept of local processing (on the user 
mobile device) of health data for the LPHS requires 
that individual components of a data submission have 
an associated quasi-identifier score (QIS). 
Additionally, as the components are made more 
generalized such as for example a submission 
including the city of submission rather than specific 
postcode, the QIS would be lower to reflect the 
increased generality. The approach also takes into 
account the case where multiple quasi-identifiers are 
submitted together as such a group of quasi-identifiers 
will have a combined QIS value that is assessed against 
privacy thresholds. The four core data components and 
their QISs used in determining the combined QIS 
(θLTDM) are Measures (MQIS), Location (LQIS), Temporal 
(TQIS) and Demographic (DQIS). For details on how the 
QIS is calculated, see [1].   
 
6.1 Public health interventions and feedback 
 
Although other participatory sensing applications 
do not have a public health intervention component, 
parallels can be drawn between some interventions and 
participatory sensing that involves tasking. The use of 
targeted or personalized tasks/interventions would 
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usually involve the LPHS knowing enough detail about 
the individual to provide this capability. However, to 
provide a higher level of privacy, 
targeting/personalization can be performed on the local 
device based on the much more specific detail 
available there. Additionally, the use of an 
anonymizing HPSN restricts the risk of the LPHS 
being aware of which individual mobile devices have 
received particular interventions.  
In a hub approach to public health interventions the 
collection of intervention effect data is similar to other 
data submissions where the type of intervention and 
the metrics of success can be considered the ‘measure’ 
and the other details, the additional data components. 
The same approach can be taken in regard to privacy 
thresholds to ensure that whilst a very specific 
intervention can be issued, it is not reported as the 
specific intervention type, if to do so would violate a 
privacy threshold.  
Stream interventions allow the public health 
intervention designers to take a more active role in the 
reporting of public health interactions. Based on the 
design of the streams the public health intervention 
designers can structure the intervention programs so 
that data collection steps are part of specific points in 
the sequence. Further, if the reporting points are major 
switching points, where a large number of individuals 
will traverse, key metrics such as the time interval 
between switching points, the path entered by and the 
path by which the individual exited the switching point 
will be able to be collected, without disclosing the finer 
detail of the individual sequence and detailed path the 
individual took which will be much more granular and 
hence raise a re-identification risk.  
A potential way to design the switching steps, the 
points in the intervention interaction where the effect 
capture is conducted and detailed intervention 
approach decisions are processed, is to allow 
individuals with more relaxed privacy thresholds to 
contribute additional data at multiple stages of 
aggregation before the switching point. That is, the 
various public health intervention pathways begin to 
aggregate at some sequence points before the switching 
point, providing finer-grained data.  
 
7. Privacy evaluation 
 
To demonstrate the operation of the LPHS in terms 
of anonymity maintenance we evaluate an example 
data submission for the Greater Sydney Metropolitan 
area based on real data distributions. This fits the 
purpose of a typical public health intervention effect 
capture as well as typically such initiatives are targeted 
to a large area. Additionally, our LPHS approach aims 
to provide high levels of privacy for participants at a 
significant scale of intervention effect capture. As 
such, we consider the use of known population data 
and an analysis of the likely k values of intervention 
effect capture at varying levels of detail will provide a 
straightforward approach to compare the effective 
privacy in terms of the risk of re-identification.  
This area of Greater Sydney has a population of 
4,391,674 as of last census. Using the Australian 
Bureau of Statistics census population statistics [17] 
we generated a random data set based on the relative 
size of the demographics, specifically looking at 
gender, age range and ancestry based on parents’ 
country of origin. Additionally, to create plausible 
intervention effect capture we then generated 
intervention application and effect data. Additionally, 
while the consideration and inclusion of control 
groupings is part of the capability of this approach, it 
doesn’t have a measurable impact on the privacy 
considerations. This is because a proportion of the 
entire participant group that is large enough to provide 
an adequate control would be larger than the k values 
we are concerned with. Additionally, as there are no 
public health interventions performed against the 
control they can’t be further identified by the type of 
intervention applied.   
Assessing the LPHS anonymity maintenance 
characteristics we generated the data set out to a 
specific number of participant’s intervention effect 
capture numbers: 50,000, 100,000, 200,000, 400,000 
and 800,000. We then tallied the number of effect 
captures for k, under the thresholds of 50> k >= 20, 
20> k >= 5, and k < 5. Having a small k value for a 
specific demographic is undesirable, as it can allow for 
potential re-identification or inference based attacks to 
be used against the data set. As such we can consider 
these k groups to represent low risk, moderate risk and 
high risk.  
 
 
Figure 4. Effect capture k value without local 
processing 
As can be seen in Figure 4, there were high 
numbers of effect captures with high or moderate risk 
at 50,000 submissions. Additionally, due to the large 
variation between the k value groups the chart is on a 
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logarithmic scale. Over 3000 effect captures have a k 
value lower than 50 and 231 have a k value lower than 
5. In practice this would be problematic in ensuring 
anonymity and privacy of data submissions. As, for 
example, if additional knowledge that an individual 
participates in the LPHS is available, it may be enough 
to perform re-identification of some individuals. As the 
number of effect captures are increased to 800,000 
these risks diminish but there is still a reasonable 
potential chance of re-identification even at significant 
data collection levels of 400,000.  
To improve this result we implemented our 
demographic formula which is part of the local 
processing approach and set a reasonably conservative 
threshold value for DQIS. The other QIS scores MQIS, 
TQIS, and LQIS were not significant values of the θLTDM 
and were not adapted. As ancestry was the optional 
value in this effect capture it was adjusted. If a DQIS 
value for an individual was over the threshold based on 
known population demographics ancestry details were 
excluded from the effect capture.  
As demonstrated in Figure 5 this resulted in a 
dramatic decrease in the number of effect captures that 
had low k values, with less than a tenth of the 
unadjusted submission approach.  Again, due to the 
large variation between the k value groups the chart is 
on a logarithmic scale. This differentiation increased as 
the number of effect captures increased with the 
adjusted submission approach reaching a safe level 
much sooner at ~400,000 and comprising as low as 
.5% of the effect captures being below the k< 5 
threshold at even the 50,000 submission level (Figure 
6).  
 
 
Figure 5. Effect capture k value with local 
processing 
The threshold at the local device level could of course 
be adjusted either higher or lower based on the 
expected submission numbers. However, it performed 
quite respectably at the initial level with a significantly 
lower level of risk at the 50,000 submission level and 
close to no statistical risk at the 400,000 level which 
represents 9.1% of the area total population. 
The limitation of this local processing approach as 
compared to a trusted server approach that performs k-
anonymity, is that the number of other submissions 
cannot be known with certainty by the local device. As 
such, the privacy threshold is set at a conservative 
value to preserve privacy. However this means that 
when there are high levels of submissions more records 
are obfuscated/adjusted than was required.  
In summary, for the example data set the LPHS 
performed favorably compared to the defined public 
health requirements and privacy limitations.  
 
 
Figure. 6. Low k value effect captures  as 
percentage of total effect capture 
 
8. Discussion and future work 
 
Our approach focused on alleviating privacy issues 
that would be inherent in developing such LPHSs. As 
such, the system would be quite resilient to extension 
via new sensors or sensor systems [18] as they would 
present just an additional data measure, where the key 
privacy restrictions are demographic, temporal and 
spatial-based. However, the extension of sensor 
capabilities potentially may reach the point where 
sensor systems are diagnostic in nature which would 
result in the measure itself being of a sensitive nature, 
in a similar manner to portions of a private electronic 
health record. These considerations can also be 
resolved within the bounds of the existing approach.  
However, privacy and public perceptions of such 
LPHSs need to be further explored.  As such, future 
work could include studies of perceived privacy of 
participatory sensing applications specific to the health 
domain. A useful extension of this approach would be 
to consider incentivization, adoption and health 
organization acceptance of such approaches. 
In addition such LPHSs as described blur the lines 
between public health intervention and “ubiquitous 
computing”-based telehealth techniques [19]. Whereas 
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the telehealth approach could use sensors in the care of 
an individual patient, the LPHS paradigm could 
involve providing targeted public health intervention 
benefits to a group of individuals. 
Whilst the LPHS limits the amount of detail of the 
data flowing to the central server in the interests of 
maintaining anonymity, this does not preclude the 
maintenance of far more detailed health-related data on 
the individual’s local device or portable personal health 
record [20]. More complex analysis of this data can 
also be carried out locally to benefit the healthcare of 
that individual [21], without transmitting this more 
complete data to the LPHS server. 
 
9. Conclusion 
 
This paper presents a sensor-based Learning Public 
Health System. This includes an iterative algorithm 
that can improve upon public health interventions over 
time via gathering feedback on the performance of 
previously distributed interventions. The paper also 
addresses the mechanisms for how iteratively updated 
interventions can be distributed. Finally, the LPHS has 
an emphasis upon maintaining the privacy of the 
individual participants in the LPHS who are the 
recipients of interventions. As such the anonymity 
preserving characteristics of the system are evaluated 
and results presented. 
 
References 
 
[1] Clarke, A., & Steele, R., "Smartphone‐based Public 
Health Information Systems: Anonymity, Privacy and 
Intervention". Journal of the Association for Information 
Science and Technology, 66(12), 2015, pp. 2596-2608.  
[2] Kalnis, P., and Ghinita, G., "Spatial K-Anonymity", in 
(Liu, L., and Özsu, M.T., 'eds.'): Encyclopedia of Database 
Systems, Springer US, 2009, pp. 2714-2714. 
[3] Predic, B., Zhixian, Y., Eberle, J., Stojanovic, D., and 
Aberer, K., "Exposuresense: Integrating Daily Activities with 
Air Quality Using Mobile Participatory Sensing", Pervasive 
Computing and Communications Workshops, 2013 IEEE 
International Conference on, 2013, pp. 303-305. 
[4] Wisniewski, M., Demartini, G., Malatras, A., and Cudré-
Mauroux, P., "Noizcrowd: A Crowd-Based Data Gathering 
and Management System for Noise Level Data", in (Daniel, 
F., Papadopoulos, G., and Thiran, P., 'eds.'): Mobile Web and 
Information Systems, Springer Berlin, 2013, pp. 172-186. 
[5] Ganti, R., Mohomed, I., Raghavendra, R., and 
Ranganathan, A., "Analysis of Data from a Taxi Cab 
Participatory Sensor Network", in (Puiatti, A., and Gu, T., 
'eds.'): Mobile and Ubiquitous Systems: Computing, 
Networking, and Services, Springer, 2012, pp. 197-208. 
[6] Ganti, R.K., Pham, N., Ahmadi, H., Nangia, S., and 
Abdelzaher, T.F., "Greengps: A Participatory Sensing Fuel-
Efficient Maps Application", Proceedings of the 8th 
international conference on Mobile systems, applications, 
and services, 2010, pp. 151-164. 
[7] Cornelius, C., Kapadia, A., Kotz, D., Peebles, D., Shin, 
M., and Triandopoulos, N., "Anonysense: Privacy-Aware 
People-Centric Sensing", 6th international conf. on Mobile 
systems, applications, and services, 2008, pp. 211-224. 
[8] Christin, D., "Impenetrable Obscurity Vs. Informed 
Decisions: Privacy Solutions for Participatory Sensing", 
Pervasive Computing and Communications Workshops 
(PERCOM Workshops), 2010 8th IEEE International 
Conference on, 2010, pp. 847-848. 
[9] Mun, M., Hao, S., Mishra, N., Shilton, K., Burke, J., 
Estrin, D., Hansen, M., and Govindan, R., "Personal Data 
Vaults: A Locus of Control for Personal Data Streams", 
Proceedings of the 6th International Conference on emerging 
Networking EXperiments and Technologies, 2010, pp. 1-12. 
[10] Clarke, A., & Steele, R. "Health Participatory Sensing 
Networks". Mobile Information Systems, 10(3), 2014, pp. 
229-242.  
[11] Friedman, C. P., Wong, A. K., & Blumenthal, D., 
"Achieving a Nationwide Learning Health System". Science 
Translational Medicine, 2010, 2(57). 
[12] Steele, R., "An Overview of the State of the Art of 
Automated Capture of Dietary Intake Information". Critical 
Reviews in Food Science and Nutrition, 55(13), 2015, pp. 
1929-1938. 
[13] Sampigethaya, K., and Poovendran, R., "A Survey on 
Mix Networks and Their Secure Applications", Proceedings 
of the IEEE, 94(12), 2006, pp. 2142-2181. 
[14] Mauw, S., Verschuren, J.H.S., and Vink, E.P., "A 
Formalization of Anonymity and Onion Routing", in 
(Samarati, P., Ryan, P., Gollmann, D., and Molva, R., 'eds.'): 
Computer Security – Esorics 2004, Springer Berlin 
Heidelberg, 2004, pp. 109-124. 
[15] Clarke, A., and Steele, R., "Summarized Data to 
Achieve Population-Wide Anonymized Wellness Measures", 
Engineering in Medicine and Biology Society (EMBC), 2012 
Annual International Conference of the IEEE, 2012, pp. 
2158-2161. 
[16] Wu, X., Kumar, V., Quinlan, J. R., Ghosh, J., Yang, Q., 
Motoda, H., ... & Zhou, Z. H. "Top 10 algorithms in data 
mining." Knowledge and Information Systems, 2008, 14(1), 
1-37. 
[17] ABS, "Census Community Profiles Sydney"2011, 
http://www.censusdata.abs.gov.au/census_services/getproduc
t/census/2011/communityprofile/1GSYD, accessed 
28/03/2013  
[18] Swan, M. "Sensor mania! The Internet of Things, 
wearable computing, objective metrics, and the Quantified 
Self 2.0." Journal of Sensor and Actuator Networks 1.3, 
2012, pp.  217-253  
[19] Steele, R., & Lo, A. “Telehealth and Ubiquitous 
Computing for Bandwidth-constrained Rural and Remote 
Areas”. Personal and Ubiquitous Computing, 2013, 17(3), 
533-543. 
[20] Steele, R., & Min, K. "HealthPass: Fine-grained Access 
Control to Portable Personal Health Records". 24th IEEE 
International Conference on Advanced Information 
Networking and Applications, 2010, pp. 1012-1019.  
[21] Steele, R., & Lo, A. “Future Personal Health Records as 
a Foundation for Computational Health". In Computational 
Science and Its Applications–ICCSA 2009, 2009 (pp. 719-
733). Springer Berlin Heidelberg. 
3468
